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Abstract
We propose a new methodology for identifying the causal effect of Protestantism ver-
sus Catholicism on the decision to become an entrepreneur. Our quasi-experimental
research design exploits religious minorities’ strong attachment to religious ethics and
the exogenous historical determination of religious minorities’ geographical distribution
in the regions of the former Holy Roman Empire in the 1500s. We analyse European
Social Survey data, collected in four waves between 2002 and 2008, and find that religious
background has a significant effect on the individual propensity for entrepreneurship, with
Protestantism increasing the probability to be an entrepreneur by around 5 percentage
points with respect to Catholicism. Our findings are stable across a number of robustness
checks, including accounting for migration patterns and a placebo test. We also provide
an extended discussion of the assumptions’ validity at the basis of our research design.
This paper is one of the first attempts to identify a causal effect, rather than a simple
correlation, of religious ethics on economic outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Religion has often been investigated as a potential driver of economic behaviour and out-
comes. In “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, Weber (1904) argued that the
ethical principles embodied by Protestantism were instrumental in the early development of
capitalism by persuading individuals in pre-capitalistic societies to engage in secular activities.
However, most of the evidence to this date has failed to confirm this hypothesis.
Becker and Woessmann (2009) dispute Weber’s original stand, arguing that the prosperity of
Protestant economies can be related to the increase in literacy induced by the Protestant tenet
of individual reading of the Bible, with no relevant role left for ethical principles. Similarly,
Cantoni (2010) find no effect of Protestant ethics on economic growth using historical German
data. Contradicting these negative results, Arrunada (2010) analyses the role of Protestantism
on several socio-economic outcomes and finds that Protestants work longer hours and have a
stronger sense of the rule of law than Catholics do.
Nevertheless, the studies that use individually reported religious denominations suffer from
an important limitation because the self-reported religious affiliations of survey participants
may be a poor proxy for the canons, ethics, and codes of conduct that define a religion, since
many people tend to report belonging to the denomination in which they were raised, regard-
less of their degree of adhesion. The striking distance between the percentage of self-declared
Christians in western Europe (70 percent) and the percentage of individuals who believe in life
after death (20 percent), despite the latter’s being the cornerstone of all Christian denomina-
tions, demonstrates the wide gap between what people report and what they do or believe.1
Accordingly, the use of self-reported religious denomination to account for individuals’ ethical
principles and beliefs could be misleading.
In addition, even when the individual’s attachment to a specific religious denomination
is observable, we are more interested in the causal impact of the relative ethical principles
associated to that attachment than in a simple correlation between religion and outcomes.
In this contribution, we suggest a new methodology for identifying the causal effect of
alternative religious ethical and social norms on a particular economic outcome, individual
propensity for entrepreneurship. Our research design is based on the claim that religious mi-
1Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Religion II data, 1998
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norities adhere more tightly to their denominations’ underlying ethical principles than do larger
religious groups. Three reasons support this claim: First, religion is an important component
of minority identity that its adherents find worth defending from the influence of the majority.
Second, ministers of minority religions must work harder to preserve their herds. Third, mi-
norities are subject to continuous erosion by the dominant religion (or, more generally, by the
dominant culture) and only the most observant can resist it. It follows that, if religious ethical
principles play any role in economic outcomes, religious minorities should demonstrate it more
forcefully than majorities do.
Under the assumption that the value of identity, the incentives of the clergy, and the pro-
cess of erosion is common among religious minorities, we may be able to identify the causal
effect of religious ethical norms on economic outcomes by comparing religious minorities. More
specifically, the differential effect of the Protestant versus the Catholic ethic will emerge in a
comparison of Protestant and Catholic minorities, differencing out all specificities attached to
being part of a religious minority.
Our analysis focuses on the European regions that once belonged to the Holy Roman Empire
of the German Nation (HRE henceforth). Focusing on the HRE has three primary advantages:
First, the rise and the geographic distribution of minorities in both denominations are due
entirely to the diffusion of Protestantism in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
(Cantoni, 2010; Spenkuch, 2011); in the former HRE regions, minority distribution depends
on historical local contingencies that may be considered exogenous to the individual labour
market choices in current times. Second, the most common denominations, Catholicism and
Protestantism, account for the largest proportion of all believers in those regions. Third, reli-
gious denominations in Europe are usually inherited from parents; individuals do not typically
convert from one Christian denomination to another (Cantoni, 2010).
We investigate the role of religious ethics in entrepreneurship, one of the most fundamental
elements of a market economy.2 Our research question concerns whether the propensity for en-
trepreneurship is more or less affected by the cultural and ethical traits of Protestantism than
by those of Catholicism. According to the psychological literature, entrepreneurship depends
on individual psychological traits like determination, the need for achievement, resilience, self-
confidence, and a sense of independence (McClelland, 1961; Cuervo, 2005). McClelland (1961)
2We use the words “entrepreneurs” and “the self-employed” interchangeably.
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and Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) suggest that all these attributes may be significantly
influenced by the ethical principles inherent in Protestantism and Catholicism. The economic
literature on entrepreneurship introduces a generic entrepreneurship ability and the level of
risk aversion as the fundamental determinants of the individual decision to become an en-
trepreneur (see Parker, 2005 for a review). Both factors are likely to be influenced by traits
like determination and self-esteem, and in turn by religious ethical principles.
In this respect, our attempt to answer this research question may be considered an indirect
test of Weber’s (1904) original theory. While we do not investigate the historical process that
led to the development of capitalism in Europe, as Weber did, we do provide an empirical
investigation of the cultural determinants of economic behaviour in contemporary economies.
To this end, we use European Social Survey data from 2002 to 2008, along with other datasets,
to investigate our research question and test the validity of our identification strategy. Unlike
earlier contributions, we argue that religious ethics significantly affect economic behaviour and
outcomes.
According to our empirical findings, after controlling for a number of regional and individual
controls, such as educational attainment, family entrepreneurial background, and country or
regional fixed effects, we find that adhesion to Protestant ethical principles increases the prob-
ability to be an entrepreneur by around 5 percentage points compared to adhesion to Catholic
ethical principles.3
We discuss the validity of our research design’s assumptions and provide a number of ro-
bustness checks of our findings, including a placebo test, to show that the empirical results
are not spurious or driven by specificities related to areas where each denomination has been
historically predominant, or by migration patterns.
The paper is organized as follows. The key differences between Catholicism and Protes-
tantism are summarized in section 2. Section 3 presents our research design and provides a
discussion of our identification strategy. Data are presented in section 4 and the empirical find-
ings in section 5. Section 6 provides an extensive discussion of our identification assumptions,
section 7 concludes, and appendices follow.
3Entrepreneurship is not only a matter of individual decision and preferences; it also depends on the oppor-
tunities and risks associated with self-employment, which may vary sharply across countries and sometimes even
across regions of the same country. Opportunities and risks are often shaped by fiscal rules, by their degree of
enforcement, and by other forms of regulation. (See Cuervo, 2005 for a detailed discussion of the determinants
of entrepreneurship.) These elements are accounted for in our empirical analysis.
4
2 Catholicism and Protestantism
Catholicism and Protestantism share the same fundamental articles of faith but they dif-
fer substantially in terms of how the religions should be lived. According to the monumental
thirteen-volume The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge by religious his-
torians Johann Jakob Herzog and Phillip Shaff, Protestantism:
retained from the Roman Catholic system all the objective doctrines of Chris-
tianity concerning the Trinity and the divine human character and work of Christ,
in fact, all the articles of faith contained in the Apostles’ and other ecumenical
creeds of the early church. But it joined issue with the prevailing soteriology, that
is, the application of the doctrines relating to Christianity [...]. It brought the be-
liever into direct relation and union with Christ as the one and all-sufficient source
of salvation, and set aside the doctrines of sacerdotal and saintly mediation and
intercession. [...] From this general principle of Evangelical freedom [...] proceed
the three fundamental doctrines of Protestantism - the absolute supremacy of (1)
the Word and of (2) the grace of Christ, and (3) the general priesthood of believers
(see the entry “Protestantism” in Herzog and Schaff, 1908, vol. IX).
The supremacy of the Word states that the scriptures are the only source of faith and
establishes the right of individual interpretation. This approach is in contrast to Catholicism,
which grounds faith both on the Bible and on tradition, and makes the decrees of Popes and
Councils the only legitimate interpreter of the word of God.
The supremacy of the grace of Christ affirms that salvation is a “free” grace to the believer
that comes directly from Christ and does not require mediation from the Church or the clergy.
Catholicism, instead, says that salvation depends on both faith and good works, stressing the
role of works.
The universal priesthood of believers states that all Christians have the right to read and
proclaim the Bible in public, and to participate to the government of the Church. However,
Catholicism is based on the exclusive authority of priesthood, and priests are considered nec-
essary mediators between God and the people (Herzog and Schaff, 1908).
These principles may shape believers’ work ethic, their appreciation of worldly success, and
their psychological traits.
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According to Cohen and Hill (2007) and references therein, Catholics should have more
collectivist personalities, that value social connections and group affiliation because Catholicism
emphasizes the sense of community and group rituality. Catholics should feel obliged to serve
their communities and might be willing to subordinate thier individual desires to the benefit of
the collective good. In the case of Protestants, the principles of a personal relationship with God
and of being the unique legitimate interpreter of the scriptures suggest a more individualistic
personality that is focused on personal goals, uniqueness, and personal control. Protestants
believe in the autonomy of the conscience, which is the ultimate judge of his actions; are keener
on self-reflection, research, and investigations; and are less inclined to mysticism than Catholics
are.
Perhaps the more marked difference between Catholicism and Protestantism regards their
work ethic. According to medieval Catholic theology, Christianity is divided between those
who have received the “calling”, whose lives are to be monastic and focused on prayer and
meditation, and those who have not received the “calling” who must struggle in the secular
world (Bonhoeffer, 1959). Meditation was superior to work which was seen as God’s punishment
for man’s original sin (Schaltegger and Torgler, 2009). This view has changed over the centuries,
but work remains associated with toil and difficulty, its merit being only that of allowing man
to share Christ’s suffering on the cross: “Sweat and toil, which work necessarily involves in the
present condition of the human race, present the Christian and everyone who is called to follow
Christ with the possibility of sharing lovingly in the work that Christ come to do” (John Paul
II, 1981, Laborem Exercens: Encyclical Letter of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II on Human
Work).
Protestantism in both the Calvinistic and Lutheran traditions maintains that work of what-
ever kind is honourable, necessary, and a service to God. Luther dismissed the separation be-
tween the “called” and the others, contending that, just as some are called to serve God in the
religious ministry, others are called to serve God through secular labours; there is no spiritual
distinction between the two (Eaton, 2013).4
Catholicism and Protestantism differ also in their attitudes toward worldly success. The
Catholic Church tends to orient its members toward the hereafter since success in the secular
4Luther’s and Calvin’s views regarding the morality of trade activity differed. Luther looked at trade as
a way to take advantage of others’ needs, while Calvin considered trade and commerce useful and that those
engaged in trade provide a service to society at a risk to themselves.
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world and economic achievement are not indications of salvation. On the other hand, Protes-
tants are highly concerned with worldly success, the attainment of material possession, status,
and the prestige that is associated with upward social mobility since these achievements are
viewed as hints of salvation (Mayer and Sharp, 1962).5
Weber (1904) thought that the Catholics’ “communitarian” ethic impedes educational and
economic achievement while the Protestants’ “inner worldly asceticism” with its emphasis on
individual achievement, facilitates success (Greeley, 1989). Psychologists like McClelland (1961)
claim that ideas and values of the Protestant work ethic determine child-rearing practices of
independence, delay of gratification and mastery, which lead to the children’s developing strong
motivations to achieve. These high achievers are likely to become successful entrepreneurs
(Furnham, 1987). According to the economic literature on entrepreneurship, the decision to
become an entrepreneur depends on an individual’s exogenously-distributed entrepreneurship
ability (Lucas, 1978), on the individual probability that a new venture will survive (Holmes
and Schmitz, 1990), and/or on the individual level of risk aversion (Kilhstrom and Laffont,
1979) (see Parker, 2005 for a review). All of these factors are likely to be affected by the
character traits that the psychologists suggest are influenced by Protestantism. For instance
the probability that a new venture will survive may depend on the individual’s determination
and willingness to succeed. Alternatively, the individual’s disposition toward hard work might
serve to lower the risk of failure (Parker and Belghitar, 2006).
3 Research Design
This paper’s purpose is that of testing whether there exists a differential effect of the Protes-
tant ethic, compared to the Catholic ethic, on the propensity for entrepreneurship.
A major issue in dealing with the ethical and cultural content of religions is that self-
identification with a certain religious creed does not necessarily imply internalization of its
religious ethical principles, so the implications derived from a simple comparison of individuals’
reported affiliations may be misleading. The literature has often used various religiousness-
5Such is the case especially in Calvinism. According to the Calvinist concept of predestination, God decides
a person’s salvation or damnation before his or her birth, but it is hidden from the person, who can do nothing
to alter fate. Worldly success came to be regarded as a sign of one’s being among the select group that God
will save from damnation (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Arrunada, 2010).
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intensity indicators to measure individual attachment to religious beliefs (McCleary and Barro,
2006), but most of these indicators, such as the frequency of attendance of religious services,
weekly prayers, and donation of money and time to religious organizations, are likely to be
endogenous to labour market outcomes.6
To overcome this problem, we propose an indirect measure of attachment to religious prin-
ciples: the condition of belonging to a religious minority. Members of minority religions are
more fervent and strict in their faith than are members of majority religions for three primary
reasons.
First, according to Bisin and Verdier (2000), Bisin and Verdier (2001), and Bisin, Topa, and
Verdier (2004), religion, along with language, history and culture, is an important element of
people’s identity that minorities seek to defend.
Second, Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone (1995), Finke and Stark (1998), and Stark (1998)
suggest that the clergy of a minority religion works harder to preserve its followers from the
constant pressure of the surrounding dominant religion. Third, because of this pressure, only
people who are strongly attached to the faith can resist the influence of the majority religion
and preserve their creed.
We verify these intuitions by examining the behaviour of Protestant and Catholic minorities
in Europe using ISSP Religion III data and find that members of religious minorities declare
themselves to be more religious and to pray more often and more regularly than their non-
minority counterparts do. Minority Protestants tend to agree more with the principles of direct
and unmediated relationship with God (one tenet of Protestantism) than other Protestants do,
and minority Catholics believe more than other Catholics that salvation can be achieved by
means of good works and that individual fate is not predetermined (one tenet of Catholicism).
The minorities of both confessions are more likely to believe in life after death, heaven, and
hell, and both minorities tend to have more confidence in churches. Finally, while practically
non-existent among majority denominations, transitions from one denomination to another are
more frequent among minorities, which is in line with the argument that the pressure from
the dominant religions pushes the less fervent out, leaving only those who are most strongly
attached to their faith.7
6Among the early contributions in the economics of religion, Tomes (1984) uses the religion in which one
was raised to limit the concern of endogeneity.
7See Appendix A and B.1 for details.
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Central to our identification strategy is that being born into a religious minority is exogenous
because the rise and geographic distribution of minorities of both denominations are historically
determined, following the equilibrium found at the end of the religious wars of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries that depended mainly on contingent historical conditions (Cantoni,
2010, Cantoni, 2011). This distribution has persisted over the centuries because of the inter-
generational transmission of religion within families, so it can be considered exogenous to
individual labour market choices in current times. (See the appendix B for a more extensive
argumentation.)
On these grounds, the differential effect of Protestantism versus Catholicism on en-
trepreneurship can be identified by comparing minority communities, provided that Protes-
tant and Catholic minorities are alike in terms of characteristics relevant to entrepreneurship
other than ethical principles. We discuss to what extent Protestant and Catholic minorities
are comparable in section 6.
The rationale of our research design is summarized in Figure 1, where we plot the propensity
to become an entrepreneur on the vertical axis and the degree of adhesion to a religion’s ethics
on the horizontal axis. The degree of adhesion is a latent variable that is not directly observed;
what we observe for each individual is the market share of the denomination to which he or
she belongs, which is inversely correlated with the degree of adhesion.
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
As Figure 1 shows, when the degree of adhesion to one’s religious ethics is zero, the likeli-
hood that one will choose to be self-employed is unaffected by religious affiliation; the reported
religious affiliation carries no specific religious content and has no consequence on entrepreneur-
ship. We refer to this feature as the “common intercept hypothesis” which can be tested in our
empirical analysis. As the degree of adhesion increases, both Protestantism and Catholicism
increasingly influence entrepreneurship, possibly in a specific fashion.8 In order to evaluate
any differential effect of religious ethics on entrepreneurship, we must compare individuals with
maximum religious attachment.
We consider a sample of self-declared Protestant and Catholic individuals9 and define the
8Here, the relationship between religious attachment and propensity to entrepreneurship is assumed to be
linear for exposition purposes only, but linearity is not required.
9We exclude atheists because they are likely to differ from religious individuals in some key respects, such
9
following regression model:
Yirc = α0 + α1Pirc + α2Airc + α3AircPirc + γ1Xirc + µirc + εirc (1)
where Yict is propensity for entrepreneurship of individual i living in region r of country c;
Pirc is a dummy indicating whether i is Protestant; and A is i’s degree of adhesion to his or
her religion. A set of observable controls Xirc—which include individual, regional and country
controls that we specify below and a set of unobservable controls µirc, such as social ties and
networks, level of risk aversion and preferences—contribute to the individual propensity for
entrepreneurship. Suppose that Aict is defined over the interval [0, 1], where 0 corresponds to
no adhesion and 1 to full adhesion to the ethical principles of i’s creed. Assume that :
Assumption 1.
E(µirc|Pirc, Airc = 1, Xirc) = E(µirc|Airc = 1, Xirc) = ω1 (2)
E(µirc|Pirc, Airc = 0, Xirc) = E(µirc|Airc = 0, Xirc) = ω0
meaning that the expected contribution on unobservables, conditional to Aict and Xict is the
same among Protestant and Catholics, and equal to ωA for A = 0, 1 . The full differential effect
of Protestantism compared to Catholicism on the propensity for entrepreneurship is given by:
E(Yirc|Pirc = 1, Airc = 1, Xirc)− E(Yirc|Pirc = 0, Airc = 1, Xirc) = α1 + α3 (3)
A test for the common intercept hypothesis is that
E(Yirc|Pirc = 1, Airc = 0, Xirc)− E(Yirc|Pirc = 0, Airc = 0, Xirc) = α1 (4)
is not significantly different from zero.
Since the degree of adhesion is unobservable, we rephrase model (1) in terms of minorities,
where the proportion of individuals with strong religious feelings is large, and on majorities,
where the proportion of people who are largely unattached to the ethical principles of their
confession is large.
as risk aversion, as we discuss in section 6.4 and Appendix D. We also exclude other religious denominations
since they have very small market shares in our data
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Our definitions of a religious minority and a religious majority respond to two considerations.
First, a minority market share should be small enough to justify the hypothesis that a certain
degree of effort is required to maintain one’s religious identity and to embody the religion’s
ethical principles. Second, a majority should be large enough to suggest that religious affiliation
does not necessarily entail internalization of ethical principles but may be simply a label upon
which a community is defined. Market shares are always defined with reference to the total
population, atheists included, to reflect this concept. Therefore, our baseline specification
assumes that minorities should be smaller than 25 percent of the individuals in a community
and that majorities should be larger than 50 percent.10 These definitions allow us to avoid
defining as minority or majority a denomination whose market share is only marginally smaller
or larger than that of other denominations. In other words, we exclude situations in which the
difference between a religious minority and a religious majority is minor.11
Our baseline definitions of religious minorities and majorities are as follows.
Definition 1. Definition 1 (Minority): The denomination dir of an individual i residing in
region r is considered a minority if (a) the market share of dir is the smallest in region r; and
(b) its market share in region r is less than 25 percent.12
Definition 2. Definition 2 (Majority): The denomination dir of an individual i residing in
region r is considered the majority if (a) the market share of dir is the largest in region r; and
(b) its market share in region r is larger than 50 percent.
Then we define the counterpart of model (1) as:
Yirc = β0 + β1Pirc + β2Mirc + β3mirc + β4MircPirc + β5mircPirc + δ1Xirc + µirc + θirc (5)
10In the regions of the former HRE, the maximum incidence of Protestants is around 52 percent, whereas
the maximum incidence of Catholics is around 88 percent.
11Our empirical results are remarkably stable when we adopt other sensible thresholds because the geographic
distribution of minorities and majorities in regions of the former HRE follows an obvious pattern that does not
leave much room for interpretation, especially considering that we want the difference between a minority and
a majority market share to be large. Since the maximum incidence of Protestantism is 52 percent, we cannot
use majority thresholds that are greater than 50 percent. See E for additional details.
12This definition of a minority denomination is the most stringent among the definitions that are discussed
in Appendix E. In our sample of regions of the former HRE, 18.4 percent of religious individuals are Protestants
and 81.6 percent are Catholics. The sampled Protestants who reside in regions where they are in the minority
are 20.6 percent of the total; the corresponding figure for Catholics is around 3.9 percent. Therefore, minority
Protestants and Catholics are 3.8 percent and 3.2 percent of our total sample, respectively.
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where Mirc is a dummy that equals one if individual i is part of any religious majority, and
mirc is a dummy that equals one if individual i is part of any religious minority. MircPirc and
mircPirc are interactions between the majority/minority dummies and the Protestant dummy,
and θirc is an IID error term.
Although minority and majority conditions are correlated with the degree of adhesion, they
do not perfectly reflect the degree of adhesion. To see how model (5) compares to (1), suppose,
for the sake of simplicity, that Airc takes only values 0 and 1 and that the proportion of
individuals that display full adhesion to their religious ethic is piP in Protestant minorities, piC
in Catholic minorities and ΠP and ΠC in Protestant and Catholic majorities, respectively, with
piP > ΠP and piC > ΠC .
We assume:
Assumption 2.
piP = piC = pi (6)
ΠP = ΠC = Π
meaning that there is the same distribution of adhesion to ethical principles among Protes-
tant and Catholic minorities (resp. majorities). The joint assumptions 1 and 2 formalize the
identification hypothesis that Protestant and Catholic minorities (resp. majorities) are compa-
rable.
By applying the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
E(Yirc|Pirc = 1,mirc = 1, Xirc) = (7)
= pi × E(Yirc|Pirc = 1, Airc = 1,mirc = 1, Xirc) +
+(1− pi)× E(Yirc|Pirc = 1, Airc = 0,mirc = 1, Xirc) =
= α0 + α1 + pi(α2 + α3) + piω1 + (1− pi)ω0
for Protestant minorities and similar expressions for the other religious groups. Combin-
ing these quantities, the expected difference in the propensity for entrepreneurship between
12
Protestant and Catholic minorities is
E(Yirc|Pirc = 1,mirc = 1, Xirc)− E(Yirc|Pirc = 0,mirc = 1, Xirc) = (8)
= β1 + β5 =
= α1 + piα3
and that between Protestant and Catholic majorities is
E(Yirc|Pirc = 1,Mirc = 1, Xirc)− E(Yirc|Pirc = 0,Mirc = 1, Xirc) = (9)
= β1 + β4 =
= α1 + Πα3
The within-religion expected differences between minorities and majorities for Protestants
and Catholics, respectively, are
E(Yirc|Pirc = 1,mirc = 1, Xirc)− E(Yirc|Pirc = 1,Mirc = 1, Xirc) = (10)
= β3 − β2 + β5 − β4 =
= (α2 + α3)× (pi − Π) + (ω1 − ω0)× (pi − Π)
and
E(Yirc|Pirc = 0,mirc = 1, Xirc)− E(Yirc|Pirc = 0,Mirc = 1, Xirc) = (11)
= β3 − β2 =
= α2 × (pi − Π) + (ω1 − ω0)× (pi − Π)
Were the proportions pi and Π known, parameters α1 and α3 would be identified from (8)
and (9), while parameter α2 cannot be identified even in this favourable case since the term
(ω1−ω0)(pi−Π) which is the difference in the unobservables between majorities and minorities
of a given religion,13 is unknown.
13That is E(µirc|Pirc,mirc = 1, Xirc)− E(µirc|Pirc,Mirc = 1, Xirc) for both Pirc = 0, 1.
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From equations (8) and (9) we obtain:
α1 = β1 + β4 − (β5 − β4)Π
pi − Π (12)
α3 =
β5 − β4
pi − Π (13)
and the effect of Protestantism α1 + α3 is equal to:
α1 + α3 = β1 + β5 + (1− pi)α3 (14)
Indeed, the observable quantity β1 + β5, which is the differential effect between Protestant
and Catholic minorities, as determined from (5), captures the effect of Protestantism up to
the bias −(1 − pi)α3. The latter tends to disappear as pi approaches 1, that is, the better the
condition of belonging to a minority proxies for a strong attachment to religion. Moreover,
given equation (13), the sign of α3 coincides with the sign of β5 − β4.
The specification test statistics becomes
α1 = β1 + β4 − Πα3 (15)
and the observable quantity β1 + β4, which is the differential effect between Protestant and
Catholic majorities according to (5), captures the parameter of interest α1 up to the bias Πα3,
which tends to disappear as Π approaches 0, that is, the better the condition of belonging to
a majority proxies for a weak attachment to religion.
In both cases the sign of the bias depends on the sign of α3.
4 The Data
Our sample consists of European Social Survey (ESS) data, which is collected every two
years, from 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. Selecting all geographic regions from the former HRE
and excluding all non-Christian religious minorities left us with 40,633 individuals, of which
19,964 are Christians. We then focused on those who said they were active in the labour market
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and ended up with a sample of 8,966 individuals in 7 countries and 59 regions.
The countries selected for our estimation sample are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovenia. Table A.1 (in Appendix F) shows the compo-
sition of our estimation sample. Regions are defined according to their populations. The ESS
data provide several levels of regional aggregation, NUTS 1, NUTS2, and NUTS 3, the last of
which is available for only some countries. We defined minorities and majorities at the most
disaggregate level available for each country but checked to ensure our results are robust to
changes in the adopted criteria.14
FIGURES 3 AND 4 AROUND HERE
Figures 3 and 4 display the geographic distribution of Catholicism and Protestantism across
HRE regions (NUTS 2), while Figures 5 and 6 report the geographic distribution of Catholic
and Protestant minorities. Catholicism is mostly prevalent in Austria, Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovenia, while Protestantism is mostly concentrated in
Germany, where the two confessions are almost identically represented.
Europe has undergone a fast process of secularization in the last few decades. According
to our ESS sample, in most regions of France and northern Europe in the period covered by
our data, more than half of the residents declared that they were atheist. Similar patterns
are provided by ISSP religion surveys collected in 1991, 1998 and 2008 that were especially
designed to provide detailed information about various aspects of individual religiosity.
FIGURES 5 AND 6 AROUND HERE
The Czech Republic, France, and Slovenia have the smallest number of self-employed indi-
viduals as a proportion of the total number of employed individuals. Predominantly Catholic
countries like Poland have the largest proportion of self-employed individuals. Of course, such
a simple correlation is not particularly informative since it is driven by unobservable country-
specific factors that affect both religion and entrepreneurship.
FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE
14See section 5.4 for a broader discussion on how results are sensitive to the choice of different regional
aggregation levels.
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We estimate model (5) by adopting a linear probability model specification that clusters
standard errors at the regional level. We are interested in the average effect of religion on
entrepreneurship, so the linear estimator is preferable to Probit or Logit since it is consistent and
it does not require a specific distributional assumption of the error term. (For a similar approach
see Angrist and Evans, 1998.) Individual controls include age, gender, whether the individual
is a foreigner, years of education, marital status, and a wealth variable that indicates whether
the individual’s main source of income is financial. We also control for entrepreneurial family
background, that is, whether the individual’s father was self-employed. Family background is
of particular relevance since we can distinguish individuals who inherited a business (or perhaps
a propensity to be self-employed) from those who did not have such an advantage. In addition,
we include a full set of area (country or regional) and time fixed effects in order to control
for unobservable and/or institutional country (or region) characteristics and common cyclical
factors.
In all specifications we include time-varying regional controls provided by Eurostat. These
include regional GDP growth, population density, unemployment rate, number of doctors per
capita (as a proxy for social development), educational attainment at the regional level, and
the extension of motorways (as a proxy for infrastructure development). Summary statistics
are reported in Table A.2 (Appendix F).
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Baseline Estimates
We present our empirical findings starting from the estimates of our baseline specification of
equation (5). This specification accounts for differences in country-specific institutions, regional
and individuals characteristics that may affect entrepreneurship.
Table 1 displays our estimates, reporting the differential effect of Protestant minority with
respect to Catholic minority (β1+β5) from equation (5) and the differential effect of Protestant
majority with respect to Catholic majority (β1 + β4), i.e. our test of the “common intercept
hypothesis”. According to our baseline estimates (column 1), the probability that an individual
is an entrepreneur is 5.4 percentage points higher among Protestant minorities than it is among
Catholic minorities. This is a sizeable effect, as only about 13 percent of working individuals
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in Europe are self-employed.
Table 2 reports the individually estimated parameters β of model (5). We note that β5−β4
is positive and statistically significant,15 suggesting that α3 is also positive.
Therefore, we conclude that there is a significant and positive differential effect of Protestant
ethics on entrepreneurship, and the differential effect of the Protestant minority that we have
estimated is a lower bound of it (see equation (14)).
Our specification test indicates that the differential effect of Protestantism versus Catholi-
cism is not present when we compare religious majorities. The differential effect of the Protes-
tant majority is positive but not significantly different from zero. Since this test statistics is the
sum of α1 and a small upward bias (equation (15)), we conclude that also α1 is not significantly
different from zero.16
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
Column 2 of Table 1 shows similar results from the estimated model using German regions
only—the regions where Protestantism and Catholicism are almost evenly represented—where
the estimated differential effect is still significant and only marginally smaller than the baseline.
The baseline result is also robust to the exclusion of potential endogenous variables (e.g., edu-
cation, marital status, and whether the main source of wealth is financial) that could confound
the interpretation of our results in the setting of our research design (column 3).
Taken together the results here indicate that religious ethics has a significant impact on the
individual propensity for entrepreneurship when adhesion to religion is strong, as it is among
minorities. The effect is absent when the adhesion is less strong, as it is among majorities.
Regarding the effects of controls, the probability that an individual is self-employed increases
by almost 15 percentage points if his or her father was self-employed, by 6 percentage points if
the individual is male, and it is generally increasing in age and education. The effect of being
a foreigner and whether the individual’s main source of income is financial are not statistically
significant.
The next sections provide a set of robustness checks of the validity of our estimates.
15One-sided tests not reported but available upon request
16More precisely, from equation (15) we obtain α1 = (β1 + β4) − Πpi−Π (β5 − β4). It follows that α1 is not
significantly different from zero if Πpi−Π is small enough. According to our estimates, this is the case for all
Π
pi−Π < 6 i.e. whenever pi > 1.17 ·Π, a condition which looks quite plausible.
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5.2 Robustness to Migration Patterns
This section addresses the potential impact of recent waves of migration on the geographic
distribution of religious beliefs across Europe. The geographic pattern of Christian minorities
across the regions of the former HRE is historically determined since it follows the events
generated by the Reformation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.17 A comparison
of historical information with the actual distribution of minorities in selected areas of the HRE
seems to exclude that cumulative historical migration patterns may have significantly altered
the map of the incidence of denominations and minorities across Europe. (See the evidence
discussed in section B.2 of the Appendix.)
However, we cannot exclude a priori the possibility that contemporary migration patterns
could be endogenously driven by religious factors as well as by the individual propensity to start
or export a business abroad. If such is the case, the estimated relationship between religion
and entrepreneurship may be biased.
We check for the effect of migration by excluding all individuals who are immigrants (i.e.,
either non-nationals or those born abroad) and recalculating our minority indicators. Table 3
shows the new estimates in columns 1 and 2. The differential effect of Protestantism is still
positive and significant and, at 4.8 percentage points, is close to what we found in our baseline
estimation. Again, we find no significant effect when we compare majority individuals. In
addition, when we compare the immigrants’ religion with the predominant religion of the host
country, we find no clear correlation, a further indication that our findings are not confounded
by migration-related factors.
5.3 Sectoral Composition and Unpaid Family Workers
Table 3 also checks whether sectoral composition affects our estimates. We control for
sectoral composition at the individual level because of the possibility that entrepreneurship
patterns differ across industries. Accounting for the fifteen main NACE sectors of activity, we
estimate a positive and significant differential effect of Protestantism that is only marginally
smaller than that found previously, that is, around 4.5 percentage points (column 3). No
significant effect is found for majorities.
17See the discussion in Appendix B.
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Special attention should be paid to agriculture, as the agricultural sector is traditionally
characterized by a comparatively high concentration of self-employed individuals, and agri-
cultural communities are traditionally more religious than urban communities are. When we
exclude from our sample all individuals who work in agriculture, which amounts to around 3.3
percent of our observations, our point estimate remains strongly statistically significant and
close to our previous estimate of 5.1 percentage points (column 4).
Next, we exclude self-employed individuals who are unpaid family workers, that is, those
whose compensation is in a form other than wages, such as an increase in business value. In
our sample only around 1 percent of respondents (around 400) fit this category, and the effect
of excluding them is marginal (column 5).
5.4 Robustness to Regional Fixed Effects and Alternative Calcula-
tions of Minorities
Table 3 shows that our results hold when we include NUTS 1 regional fixed effects instead of
country fixed effects (column 1) as well as when we consider only regions in which respondents
from both religious denominations are represented (column 2). When minorities are calculated
at a NUTS 1 regional level for all countries,18 the estimated effect does not change (column 3),
and similar findings are estimated when minorities are calculated at the NUTS 2 level instead
of NUTS 2 or NUTS3 (column 4).
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
Finally, we estimate a model on individuals who are employed instead of just active. Around
4.6 percent of individuals in our baseline sample are unemployed. Since we know their occupa-
tion and employment status (if any) during their last employment, and since we are interested
in the causal effect of religious ethics on occupational outcomes, we include respondents who
were unemployed at the time of the survey. However, in principle, unemployed individuals may
differ from employed individuals based on unobservable dimensions.
Nevertheless, when we exclude unemployed respondents, our point estimates are very simi-
lar, confirming our intuition (column 5). In addition, all of our findings remain valid when we
18Whenever ESS provides information on respondents’ regions of residence at the NUTS 2 and 3 levels, we
aggregate at NUTS 1 and calculate which religious denomination, if any, is the minority.
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estimate our baseline model on a larger sample that includes retired individuals for whom we
know their last job before retiring (not reported).
6 Discussion of Our Identification Assumptions
In this section we discuss the validity of the assumptions (1) and (2) at the basis of our
identification strategy.
6.1 The Geographic Distribution of Minorities.
Suppose that the territories that are more inclined to commercial activities may have turned
to Protestantism in anticipation of its supposed growth-promoting potential. Or, on the other
hand, they may have remained Catholic to avoid the costs and risks of an institutional tran-
sition. Alternatively, suppose that nowadays the regions where Protestant and Catholic mi-
norities reside differ in terms of institutional characteristics that are more or less favourable to
entrepreneurship. If these hypothesis were true, then by comparing Protestant and Catholic
minorities we would capture also such differences and our results would be spurious.
To address these concerns, in this section we investigate whether the regions where Protes-
tant and Catholic minorities live are similar in all respects relevant to entrepreneurship.
An important argument in favour of comparability is that religious minorities in regions
of the former HRE are historically determined and that their rise is related to the spread of
Protestantism between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.19
Moreover and more importantly, according to Cantoni (2010, 2011) the only variables that
significantly predict a territory’s adoption of Protestantism are the distance from Wittenberg,
home of the Reform, and whether the territory was formerly an ecclesiastical domain.20 Cantoni
then argues that the determinants of conversion to Protestantism were mainly contingent on
the strategic conditions at the time of the Reform, rather than on economic considerations,
and concludes that Protestant and Catholic territories were similar in terms of their economic
potential at the time of the Reform.
19Appendix B reports extensive evidence confirming that the current distribution of religious minorities
closely reflects that which emerged at the end of the religious wars, complementing the discussion in Cantoni
(2010) and Spenkuch (2011).
20The distance from Wittenberg is understood as distance from Saxony, the powerful German state that first
supported Luther’s ideas and guaranteed military protection against possible reactions by the HRE.
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Confirming this conclusion, if pre-Reform-era characteristics mattered, we should observe
a differential propensity for entrepreneurship also between religious majorities. For instance,
if the territories that were more inclined to commercial activities had turned to Protestantism
for the most part, we should observe a positive effect of being a majority Protestant on en-
trepreneurship. However, this is not what we find in our estimates, as we find only a difference
between Protestant and Catholic minorities and no difference between majorities.
As a further check, we performed a placebo test, by randomly reshuﬄing individual religious
affiliation within each region. This reshuﬄing preserves the market shares of the religions
and the geographic distribution of majorities and minorities. We estimated model (5) on the
reshuﬄed data and checked whether a significant effect of religion resulted, which would indicate
that the effect we obtained from the baseline model is due to confounders, not to religion. We
repeated this operation 1000 times, and the effect of Protestantism was significantly different
from zero in less than four percent of the repetitions. Therefore, we can reject the possibility
of a spurious effect.
6.2 Minorities’ Social Networks and Entrepreneurship
Since the condition of being in a minority generates stronger networks and higher social
capital than does the condition of being in the majority, it could also favour entrepreneurship
through these channels rather than through religious ethics. Social networks tend to be stronger
among minorities because cooperation is easier to achieve among smaller communities, which
tend to share similar values and cultural traits (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001).
Minority religions are typically over-represented among entrepreneurs, as suggested by the
“middleman theory” (Bonacich, 1973): either minorities act as mediators between other social
groups, or they demand mediation.
Historically, Jews developed commercial and financial networks in the small communities
scattered among European cities (Botticini and Eckstein, 2005), but it was not the Jewish
religion alone that favoured entrepreneurship. The conditions that the religion is likely to
have favoured, such as close connection and trust among its members, also played a part
(Dana, 2006). Dana (2009) reviewed several examples of financial, employment, and information
networks that emerge between people of the same religion, while Ellison, Krause, Shepherd, and
Chaves (2009) and the references therein suggested that small congregations are much more
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likely than large communities to provide their members with support and protection in the
case of negative shocks. Therefore, a strong social connection could be the key to successful
entrepreneurship.
We use data from the ISSP survey on Social Networks II collected in 2001 to determine
whether there is a systematic difference between Catholic and Protestant minorities in terms
of networking. After considering a battery of social network indicators related to respondents’
network size, participation in voluntary associations, potential for financial exchange with rel-
atives and friends, social support, and generalized trust, we find no evidence of a systematic
difference between minorities in terms of social connection, as detailed in Appendix C, and
no difference between minorities and non-minorities, which confirms the absence of religious
discrimination among Protestants and Catholics in contemporary Europe.
6.3 Entrepreneurship as a Way out of Discrimination
Intense social ties within minority groups can favour entrepreneurship, but entrepreneurship
could also be a way out of discrimination. In this subsection we consider whether religious
majorities discriminate against religious minorities.
It is commonly maintained that the Catholic Church is intransigent in condemning norms,
behaviours, and conduct that are contrary to its principles, whereas the less hierarchical and
more dispersed Protestant churches are considered to be much more open and inclusive.21 If
such were actually the case, Catholic individuals should be more intolerant toward other faiths
or beliefs than Protestants are. If such is the case, Protestant minorities that are surrounded
by Catholic majorities should be over-represented among entrepreneurs, since entrepreneurship
may represent an option against discrimination and minority Catholics who live alongside open-
minded and tolerant Protestant majorities should be over-represented as non-entrepreneurs.
As a result, there should be comparatively more entrepreneurs among Protestant minorities
than among Catholic minorities, a situation that would have less to do with religious ethics
being conducive to entrepreneurship than with the majorities’ attitude towards tolerance. In
21However, the supposed higher level of tolerance of Protestant churches and Protestant people is doubtful.
According to Kaplan (2007), extreme intolerance, which was equally common across denominations and coun-
tries, lasted for at least 150 years after the end of the religious wars. Protestants were often deeply intolerant
not only of Catholics but also of each other (as confirmed by the burning of Servetus, a Spanish Protestant, in
Calvin’s Geneva). In Britain and Ireland, the civil war, the spread of Puritanism, the Catholic intolerance of
James II, and the anti-Catholic Gordon riots are examples of intolerance from both sides.
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addition, we would not find differences between religious majorities in terms of the level of
entrepreneurship because neither would be discriminated against.
In order to analyse patterns of religious discrimination in the present day, we use data
from all European countries where clear patterns of Protestant and Catholic majorities and
minorities exist. Our analysis of ISSP Religion III data reveals that 82 percent of Catholics
and 75 percent of Protestants in Europe agree with the principle that all religions deserve
respect, and about 80 percent of the members of both religions would accept the idea of a close
relative marrying a person from another religion.
The ESS data has specific information about discrimination, as respondents report whether
they are part of a group that experiences discrimination and whether that discrimination is due
to religious reasons. We perform a set of independent-sample t-tests that compare the degree
of discrimination between Protestants and Catholics in our estimation sample. The tests are
performed to compare all Protestants and all Catholics, as well as to compare minority and
majority Protestants and Catholics only. The p-values of the tests, shown in Table A.6, indicate
that there are no significant differences in the degree of discrimination perceived by the survey
respondents between confessions, even among minorities and majorities.
6.4 Risk Aversion as an Explanatory Factor
Another issue worth investigating is the role of risk aversion, which is an important ingre-
dient in entrepreneurship. (See Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979 and Ekelund, Johansson, Jarvelin,
and Lichtermann, 2005, among many others.) In principle, being Catholic, Protestant, or athe-
ist could be correlated with several attributes of individual preferences because religion and
some character traits are learned within the family. For instance, the growing literature of
endogenous preferences suggests that time preferences (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005) and trust
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008) are partly decided and shaped by parents, so it may be
reasonable to suppose that risk aversion is also learned in the family. If religious affiliation and
the propensity to choose entrepreneurship are affected by a predetermined level of risk aversion,
then our estimates may be more difficult to interpret than they would be otherwise.
We focus on Germany and use SOEP 2004 data to determine whether there are differences
between Catholics and Protestants in terms of risk aversion. Our choice of country is moti-
vated by the fact that the German SOEP provides several measures of individual risk aversion,
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along with information on respondents’ religions and family religious backgrounds. The overall
message of the analysis, discussed in detail in Appendix D, is that there are no systematic
differences in Catholics’ and Protestants’ levels of risk aversion.
This result is reassuring, as any difference in the level of entrepreneurship between the two
religions cannot be ascribed to omitting the attitude toward risk.
6.5 Degree of Adhesion among Minorities and Majorities
The identification assumption is that Protestant and Catholic minorities’ average degrees
of adhesion to their underlying religious ethical tenets are similar. A number of indirect pieces
of evidence suggest that this assumption is corroborated by the data.
First, the proportion of individuals born within religious minorities who retain their par-
ents’ religion (i.e., those who resist the pressure of the surrounding religious majority) is similar
between Protestant and Catholic minorities (69 percent for Catholics and 66 percent for Protes-
tants, a difference that is not statistically significant).22 Second, using ISSP Religion III data, we
tested whether Protestant and Catholic minorities differ in terms of level of adhesion based on
certain religious outcomes. We find no significant difference in the degree of religious adhesion
between minorities.23 Third, again with ISSP Religion III data, we estimated the proportions
of individuals who reported believing in life after death, the main tenet of Christianity, among
those individuals who reported being Protestant or Catholic and belonging to either minori-
ties or majorities.24 These proportions should serve as valid proxies for the parameters pi and
Π introduced in section 3. Our results show that 47.9 percent and 48.0 percent of minority
Protestants and minority Catholics, respectively, believe in life after death, compared to 18.5
percent and 25.8 percent among majority Protestant and Catholics, respectively.
When asked about whether they believe in hell, an aspect of Christian theology that lost
considerable attention over the last century, 29.1 percent and 28.7 percent of respondents
responded affirmatively among Protestant and Catholic minorities, respectively, against 9.0
percent and 8.0 percent among Protestant and Catholic majorities, respectively. We observed
a clear alignment in the proportions of Protestant and Catholic majorities who responded
that they believed in heaven (16.5% and 13.0%, respectively) and some discrepancy among
22See also the discussion in Appendix B.1.
23See Table A.8 in the Appendix.
24These figures are calculated using ISSP population weighted data.
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Protestant and Catholic minorities (37.0% and 53.9%, respectively). Although one should be
careful in interpreting these figures as reliable measures of pi and Π, we believe that they provide
support for our assumption (2).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we suggest a novel methodology for identifying the causal implications of
alternative ethical norms embodied by religious denominations on labour market outcomes in
regions of the former HRE in Europe. More specifically, we investigate the differential impact
of Protestantism versus Catholicism on entrepreneurship by means of a quasi-experimental
approach based on the minority status of religious denominations across those regions. We
exploit religious minorities’ stronger degree of attachment to religious ethics compared to that
of religious majorities and the exogenous historical determination of the distribution of religious
denominations that took place at the time of the Reformation in the HRE in order to elicit
the role played by religious ethical norms on labour market outcomes. In addition, we rely on
the homogeneous general economic and cultural environment to which Protestant and Catholic
minorities are subject in those regions.
Unlike previous contributions, such as Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Cantoni (2010),
our findings suggest that religious ethics may play a significant role in explaining a facet of
economic performance. We identify a significant and positive effect of Protestantism on en-
trepreneurship in finding that Protestants are 5 percentage points more likely than Catholics
to be entrepreneurs.
This effect is not the result of a correlation between religious denomination and socio-
economic characteristics, such as education, economic development, sectoral composition, or
institutions at the regional or country level. It is also robust across alternative specifications
and to a number of robustness checks, including a placebo test, and it does not depend on the
inclusion of specific geographic clusters in the sample.
Our findings on members of majority religions suggest that we can exclude any systematic
difference between individuals who generically define themselves as Protestants or Catholics
but are less observant than are individuals who practice minority religions, as no difference is
found in any of our specifications between Protestant and Catholic majorities after controlling
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for a long battery of individual and regional covariates. Only when internalization of ethical
norms and values is high, as is often the case among minorities, does a significant difference in
the impact of the two religions’ ethical norms emerge.
This result suggests that an historical, long-lasting religious tradition does not influence
entrepreneurship per se but that a genuine individual attachment to a specific religious culture
inherited through the family (in addition to all the other elements we highlighted in our analysis,
including entrepreneurial family background) is what matters in whether an individual will
choose entrepreneurship.
What are the specific normative channels through which Protestantism is more favourable
to entrepreneurship than Catholicism? We can only speculate at this stage. The emphasis of
Protestantism on the individual, unmediated relationship with God seems to be correlated to
the emergence of a strong sense of self and self-esteem, two important engines of entrepreneur-
ship. Moreover, the Protestant ethic may favour the moral approbation toward success and
wealth accumulation that could push individuals toward entrepreneurship. Since social appro-
bation develops only when the surrounding community shares the same Protestant ethics, this
interpretation fits well with the finding that Protestantism is more conducive to entrepreneur-
ship within minority denominations, where people tend to be more strictly observant than they
are in majority groups.
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Figure 1: The propensity for entrepreneurship and the degree of adhesion to Protestantism and
Catholicism
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Figure 2: Regions of the former Holy Roman Empire
NUTS 2
Figure 3: Geographic distribution of Catholicism across regions of the former Holy Roman
Empire
Source: authors’ elaboration on ESS data, 2002-2008. NUTS 2
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Figure 4: Geographic distribution of Protestantism across regions of the former Holy Roman
Empire
Source: authors’ elaboration on ESS data, 2002-2008. NUTS 2
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Figure 5: Geographic distribution of Catholic minorities across regions of the former Holy
Roman Empire
Source: authors’ elaboration on ESS data, 2002-2008. NUTS 2
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Figure 6: Geographic distribution of Protestant minorities across regions of the former Holy
Roman Empire
Source: authors’ elaboration on ESS data, 2002-2008. NUTS 2
Figure 7: Percentage of self-employed across regions of the former Holy Roman Empire
Source: authors’ elaboration on ESS data, 2002-2008. NUTS 3
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Figure 8: Central Europe, circa 1648
Source: the public domain map ”Central Europe about 1648” from the Historical Atlas by William R.
Shepherd, at the Perry-Castan˜eda Library Map Collection at the University of Texas.
Figure 9: Catholics as a percentage of residents in central Europe
Source: authors’ elaboration on ESS data, 2002-2008. NUTS 3
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Table 1: Religious denomination and the propensity for
entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3)
Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1
Min Prot - Min Cath 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.058***
s.e. (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)
Maj Prot - Maj Cath 0.000 0.005 0.002
s.e. (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Obs 8966 2659 8966
R-squared 0.071 0.080 0.067
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: dummy variable equal to one if the respon-
dent is an entrepreneur. The table presents the estimated differen-
tial effect on the propensity for entrepreneurship of being a minor-
ity Protestant compared to being a minority Catholic (Min Prot-
Min Cath). Column 1 is the baseline model; column 2 is estimated
on German regions only; column 3 excludes potentially endogenous
variables. All columns are estimated by a linear probability model
and include country and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the regional level. Individual level controls include whether
the respondent is a foreign national, age, gender, whether the re-
spondent’s father was self-employed, years of education, marital sta-
tus, and whether the respondent’s main source of income is finan-
cial. Regional controls include unemployment rate, GDP growth,
the extent of motorways, population density, number of doctors per
thousand residents, proportion of college graduated residents. Maj
Prot-Maj Cath is the test of whether there is a significant difference
in the propensity for entrepreneurship between majorities.
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Table 2: Religious denomination and the propensity for entrepreneurship.
All parameters.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Parameter Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1
PROTESTANT β1 -0.021 -0.021 -0.018
(0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
MAJORITY β2 -0.014 0.025 -0.017*
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
MINORITY β3 0.015 0.011 0.015
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
PROTESTANT*MAJ. β4 0.021 0.026 0.021
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024)
PROTESTANT*MIN. β5 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.077***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Estimates of equation (5). Dependent variable: dummy variable equal to one if respondent
is an entrepreneur. Column 1 is the baseline model; column 2 is estimated on German re-
gions only; column 3 excludes potentially endogenous variables. All columns are estimated
by a linear probability model and include country and time fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the regional level. Individual level controls include whether the respon-
dent is a foreign national, age, gender, whether the respondent’s father was self-employed,
years of education, marital status, and whether the respondent’s main source of income
is financial. Regional controls include unemployment rate, GDP growth, the extent of
motorways, population density, number of doctors per thousand residents, proportion of
college graduated residents.
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Table 3: Religious denomination and the propensity for entrepreneurship: ro-
bustness checks 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1
Min Prot - Min Cath 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.053***
s.e. (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011)
Maj Prot - Maj Cath -0.003 -0.004 -0.022 -0.028 -0.001
s.e. (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.028) (0.022)
Obs 8508 8213 7875 8671 8855
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.168 0.058 0.073
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is an entrepreneur. The
table presents the estimated differential effect of being a minority Protestant compared to
being a minority Catholic, on the propensity for entrepreneurship (Min Prot-Min Cath). Col-
umn 1 excludes all non-national immigrants; column 2 excludes all born-abroad immigrants;
column 3 controls for sector of activity at the individual level; column 4 excludes individu-
als whose main activity is in agriculture; and column 5 excludes unpaid family workers. All
columns are estimated by a linear probability model and include country and time fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Individual level controls include
whether the respondent is a foreign national, age, gender, whether the respondent’s father
was self-employed, years of education, marital status, and whether the respondent’s main
source of income is financial. Regional controls include unemployment rate, GDP growth,
the extent of motorways, population density, number of doctors per thousand residents, pro-
portion of college graduated residents. Maj Prot-Maj Cath is the test of whether there is a
significant difference in the propensity for entrepreneurship between majorities.
40
Table 4: Religious denomination and the propensity for entrepreneurship: ro-
bustness checks 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1 Entr.=1
Min Prot - Min Cath 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.058***
s.e. (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Maj Prot - Maj Cath 0.156 -0.004 -0.005 -0.000 0.002
s.e. (0.038) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
Obs 8966 8563 8978 8966 8561
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.073
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Dependent variable: dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is an entrepreneur. The
table presents the estimated differential effect of being a minority Protestant compared to
being a minority Catholic, on the propensity to be an entrepreneur (Min Prot-Min Cath).
Column 1 includes NUTS 1 regional fixed effects instead of country fixed effects; column 2
is estimated only on regions where both religions are represented; minorities in column 3 are
identified at the NUTS 1 regional level instead of NUTS 2 and NUTS 3; whenever possible,
minorities in column 4 are identified at the NUTS 2 regional level instead of NUTS 3; and
column 5 includes employed individuals only instead of active individuals. All columns are
estimated by a linear probability model and include country and time fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the regional level. Individual level controls include whether the respon-
dent is a foreign national, age, gender, whether the respondent’s father was self-employed,
years of education, marital status, and whether the respondent’s main source of income is
financial. Regional controls include unemployment rate, GDP growth, the extent of motor-
ways, population density, number of doctors per thousand residents, proportion of college
graduated residents. Maj Prot-Maj Cath is the test of whether there is a significant differ-
ence in the propensity for entrepreneurship between majorities.
41
Appendices
A Religiosity among Minorities
There are three primary reasons that members of minority religions are often considered
more religious and more observant of ethical norms than are followers of the same religion
when they are in the majority: religion is an important factor in people’s identity (Bisin and
Verdier, 2000; Bisin, Topa, and Verdier, 2004), ministers of a minority religion work harder than
do those of a majority religion to preserve their herd (the so-called market share hypothesis;
Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone, 1995; Finke and Stark, 1998; Stark, 1998), and the pressure of
the majority religion selects out the less fervent.
To test the strength of this claim, we use data on a large number of European countries
from ISSP Religion III, a multi-country survey collected in 2008.25 We look at nine possible
outcomes: three related to the intensity of religiosity, five to articles of faith, and one to
confidence in churches and religious organizations. The three religious-intensity measures are
the average number of times an individual prays per week,26 whether an individual prays
regularly,27 and a self-assessment of the individual’s religiosity that is measured by a dummy
that is equal to one when the individual reports being “extremely, very, or somewhat religious”
and 0 otherwise.28
Regarding articles of faith, we initially considered two elements that point to the specifics of
Protestantism and Catholicism. The personal and un-mediated relationship with God is a tenet
of Protestantism that gives a more minor role to the clergy and the religious institution than
Catholicism does. Respondents were asked whether they agree (on a scale from 1 to 5) with the
statement, “I have my own way of connecting with God without churches or religious services”.
Another point of differentiation between the two religions is their approach to predestination:
25Included countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
26Praying should depend mainly on individual religiosity and only marginally on the supply of churches and
priests, unlike attendance at religious services.
27Defined as at least once per month.
28Although religiosity does not necessarily imply adhesion to religious ethical norms, people who are more
religious are typically also more strictly observant. One reason behind this correlation is the actions of the
priests, which transmit both religious norms and the need to profess one’s faith actively. Given this correlation,
religiosity has often been preferred over religious denomination as a measure of the degree of attachment to
religious cultural beliefs (McCleary and Barro, 2006).
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Catholicism states that salvation can be obtained and deserved by means of good works, while
Protestantism indicates that salvation is God’s grace and that good works signal individual
fate but cannot alter it. A measure of the respondents’ views on predestination is their level of
agreement with the statement, “There is little that people can do to change the course of their
lives”. From these two questions we derive two dummies, each of which is equal to one when
the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement and zero otherwise.
The three articles of faith that are common to both religions regard beliefs about life af-
ter death, heaven, and hell. We coded them as dummies that are equal to one if individuals
answered “yes, definitely” or “yes, probably” and zero otherwise. The last outcome is confi-
dence in churches and other religious organizations, which is coded one if respondents reported
“complete” or “a great deal of confidence” and zero otherwise.
For each outcome we estimated a model analogous to (5):
Yirc = λ0 + λ1Pirc + λ2mircCirc + λ3mircPirc + λ4Xirc + θN1 + εirc (16)
which tests whether Protestant and/or Catholic minorities behave and believe differently from
other Protestants and Catholics.
Outcome Yirc of individual i living in region r (defined at NUTS 2 whenever possible) of
country c is regressed over individual religion, captured by the dummy P (where 1 is coded for
Protestantism and 0 for Catholicism), and two interactions between the minority status and
individual i’s religion, Protestant (mP ) or Catholic (mC). These interactions take the value
1 when the individual’s religion is held by a minority in his or her region of residence. Next,
gender, age, years of education, parents’ religion, urban or rural residence and regional (NUTS
1) fixed effects denoted by X and θN1 respectively, are included as controls. Coefficients λ2
and λ3 identify the differential effect of minorities compared to the remaining population of
the same faith.29 The computation of religious market shares that enter into the definition of
minorities is based on the religion of respondents’ parents in order to identify the historical
religious distribution across regions and avoid the fluctuations that are connected with the
recent secularization trends.30
29A model with some analogies to this is estimated in Gruber (2005).
30This approach is made possible by the richness of information about religious family background that is
available in the ISSP Religion III data
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TABLE A.3 AROUND HERE
Estimates for each outcome are reported in Table A.3. As expected, religious minorities
tend to pray more and to pray more regularly than religious non-minorities do, and they report
being more religious.31 Turning to the articles of faith, minority Protestants tend to agree more
with the principle of a direct and unmediated relationship with God than do other Protestants,
and minority Catholics believe more than other Catholics do that salvation can be achieved by
means of good works and that an individual’s fate is not predetermined. As for the articles of
faith common to both religions, we find that the minorities of both religions are more likely to
believe in life after death, heaven, and hell than the majorities are. Finally, both minorities tend
to have more confidence in churches–more so among minority Catholics–than do the majorities.
B The Persistence of Religious Denomination
Here we discuss two closely related issues: the stability of religious denomination in Europe
across generations, and the historical determination and persistence over time of the geographic
distribution of religions, especially of religious minorities.
B.1 Religion is an Inheritance from Parents
Religion and religiosity are transmitted by parents to their children, generation after gener-
ation (Hoge, Petrillo, and Smith, 1982; Clark and Worthington, 1987; Ozorak, 1989; Hayes and
Pittelkow, 1993; Bran˜as-Garza and Neuman, 2006). While in the US religious denomination is
more likely to change during the individual’s lifetime, Europe is characterized by strong inter-
generational religious persistence (Cantoni, 2010). Usually, the only European individuals who
change denominations are those who become atheists.
According to ISSP Religion III data, 96 (94) percent of respondents who had two Catholic
(Protestant) parents were raised Catholic (Protestant). Of those raised Catholic (Protestant),
83 (79) percent continue to follow their denomination when they reach adulthood, while 16 (20)
percent become atheists, and only about 1 (1) percent convert to Protestantism (Catholicism).
When we exclude eastern European countries, where atheism was promoted by the Communist
31These results contrast with those of Gruber (2005), which finds a positive relationship in the US between
attendance in religious services and the share of residents who share the same religion.
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regimes, we find that 80 percent of Catholics and 79 percent of Protestants maintain the religion
in which they were raised, and 19 percent and 20 percent, respectively, become atheists. Overall,
about 80 percent of respondents follow their parents’ religion, with a slightly higher persistence
among Catholics.
These proportions change somewhat among minorities, as an effect of the pressure of the
surrounding majority religion. Among Protestant (Catholic)minorities, 66 (68) percent keep
their parents’ religion, 26 (25) percent become atheists and 8 (7) percent convert to Catholicism
(Protestantism). The higher levels of conversion for those in a minority religion are partly
explained by the fact that only about half of the people who belong to a minority religion
marry someone with the same religion, compared to more than 80 percent who do so in the
total population.32.
B.2 Stability of Minorities Over the Long Run
The formation of Protestant and Catholic minorities in Europe is closely related to the
pattern of conversion to Lutheranism during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in a pop-
ulation that had been uniformly Catholic for at least eight centuries. In the mid-seventeenth
century, central Europe, under the flag of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, was
a patchwork of religions, with Catholic enclaves surrounded by Protestant territories and vice
versa. This pattern was the outcome of a weak central power. Two hundred twenty-five fiefs
and free cities, some comparatively large and some so small that they consisted of only one
village, composed the HRE at the time of the Augsburg Peace (1555). In most cases, even the
largest of these were territorially fragmented because of the marriages between prince families,
and all pursued increased autonomy from the emperor. In this context, religion was not only
a matter of spirituality but also a weapon in the political arena that consisted of the emperor,
the church, and the nobles (Dixon, 2002).
Following the publication of Luther’s 95 theses (1517), Lutheranism expanded even though
it was formally banned with the Edict of Worms, and many princes converted. In 1531 the
Schmalkaldic League was created among the Protestant territories as a mutual defence against
the emperor. The League was defeated and dispersed in 1547, but Lutheranism was nonetheless
32Similar patterns have been found using data on subsamples of countries from both ISSP Religion 2 (1998)
and ISSP Religion 1 (1991), except that secularization is less pronounced.
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legitimated in the Peace of Augsburg (1555). The principle of cuius regio eius religio (“whose
realm, his religion”) granted the rulers the right to decide the official and unique religion of their
territories to which their subjects could subscribe or leave the territory with their possessions.
This principle applied with two exceptions: The Reservatum Ecclesiasticum provided that in
the ecclesiastical territories, the prince-bishops who converted to Lutheranism had to abandon
their power and be replaced by a Catholic, but their subjects could continue to practice their
faith, whether it was Catholic or Lutheran, and the Declaratio Ferdinandei exempted some
of the cities from the requirement of religious uniformity if the reformed religion had been
practised there since the mid-1520s. As a result there were a few cities and towns, where
Catholics and Lutherans lived together (Holborn, 1982).
The outcome of these norms, coupled with the Empire’s fragmentation, was a dispersed
geographic distribution of Protestantism and Catholicism in central Europe.33 Protestantism
dominated the northern territories, with the notable exceptions of large ecclesiastical fiefs, like
the Bishoprics of Munster and Wurzburg, the Archbishoprics of Magdenburg and Tier, and the
free cities of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck. The South, with Bavaria and Austria, was pre-
dominantly Catholic but it also had several free cities, such as Augsburg, Ulm, and Krempten,
that were largely or significantly Protestant. Wurttemberg (the second-largest southern fief)
joined the Schmalkaldic League before being restored to Catholicism.
Essentially the same religious pattern that emerged four centuries ago is present in today’s
Central Europe. This similarity is made apparent by comparing Figures 8 and 9. Figure 8
reports the map of the HRE after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), highlighting the Hapsburg
domains, Bavaria, and the Ecclesiastic possessions, all areas with a massive Catholic presence.
Figure 9 shows the same area today, with the proportion of Catholics in each region. The match
between the two is very good as it is exemplified by the regions bordering the Netherlands,
occupied by the important Bishopric of Munster, which currently have a significant Catholic
population, although the Netherlands and northern Germany are largely Protestant.
FIGURES 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE
Spenkuch (2011), who collects historical information (1555 and 1624) about the prevalent
33Religious wars continued in Europe for almost a hundred years. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) that ended
the Thirty Years War confirmed the religious situation emerged a century before with the Peace of Augsburg
(Parker, 1997). The Peace also made the imperial power more symbolic than real, guaranteeing the rooting of
Protestantism.
46
religion in each of the modern German counties, confirms these patterns. Since detailed demo-
graphic data in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are not available, Spenkuch determines
the prevalent religion at the county level by taking into account the size of the fiefs included
within the borders of the current counties. The religion of each fief is that of its ruler according
to cuius regio eius religio principle. A comparison of the geographic distribution of religions
in 1624 with today’s distribution reveals that the two largely overlap. Moreover, microdata
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) reveals that the probability of an individual’s
reporting to be Protestant today (compared to Catholic or atheist) is significantly higher in
counties that were prevalently Protestant in 1624 than it is in those that were prevalently
Catholic.
We complement Spenkuch’s analysis in two ways. First, we compare the proportion of his-
torically Protestant counties34 in each of the modern German lander (state) with the proportion
of Protestant fellows today; to be consistent with the historical data, we take into account only
religious people. The correlation is as high as 0.87 when we focus only on the landers of the
former Federal Republic of Germany, and it is 0.90 when we consider all German landers.35.
TABLE A.4 ABOUT HERE
Second, we look at the modern German Catholic dioceses, whose boundaries in many cases
almost perfectly reproduce those of the antique bishoprics, such as in the case of the dioceses
of Mainz, Munster, Wurzburg. There are twenty-seven Catholic dioceses in today’s Germany,
compared to sixteen landers and more than four hundred counties. Thus, dioceses are dis-
aggregated enough to generate considerable variability, but given their size, their religious
composition is not significantly altered by the residents’ normal mobility at more disaggregated
geographic levels. Another advantage of using the modern German Catholic dioceses is that it
is relatively simple to associate each diocese with the corresponding states at the time of the
Thirty Years War and to gauge their relative importance.
Table A.4 reports the proportion of Catholics today for each Catholic diocese, the most
important Catholic and Protestant territories in 1618 that are totally or partially included
34We rely on Spenkuch (2011)’s dataset and account for mixed counties (i.e., those without a prevalent
religion) by attributing them to both the set of Protestant counties and the set of Catholic counties, giving each
half the weight.
35However, in the East, after fifty years of Communist regime, less than 30 percent of the people report being
religious.
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in the current borders of the diocese, and an evaluation of the relative importance of the
Protestant territories compared to Catholic territories, based on their relative size. We find
that the correlation between the proportion of Catholic residents today and the historical
relevance of Protestantism (measured over a 5-point scale, where 1 is highest importance) is as
high as 94 percent.
C Minorities and Social Connections
Minorities are typically characterized by strong social ties, so entrepreneurship may be
influenced by these ties, rather than by religious ethical norms. However, as long as social
connections are similarly distributed among Protestant and Catholic minorities, their effect is
cancelled out by our differencing. Using European data collected from the ISSP survey on
Social Networks II, which was produced in 2001,36 we explore whether the extent of social
connections among Protestant and Catholic minorities in Europe is comparable. We estimate
equation (16) using a battery of social network indicators as dependent variables.
Outcome variables refer to 1) the number of a) close friends in the workplace, b) close
friends who live near the respondent, and c) other close friends; 2) participation in volunteer
work with local organizations; 3) the ability to borrow money from relatives and friends in case
of need; 4) the number of times the respondent has helped relatives and friends with housework
or shopping in the current year; 5) the number of times the respondent has lent money to
relatives and friends in the current year; 6) to what extent relatives and friends are sources of
information for finding a job; 7) how often the respondent helped someone to find a job; 8)
the self-reported level of trust in other people; and 9) the self-reported perception of others’
opportunism37
36The European countries included in ISSP Social Networks II are: Germany, the UK, Austria, Hungary,
Norway, Slovenia, Poland, Spain, Latvia, France, Denmark, Switzerland, and Finland.
37The definitions of the outcomes of Table A.5 are reported here. Each outcome is based on a single question
from the ISSP Social Networks II survey, as detailed below. The questions are indicated in italics.
1) Thinking about people at your workplace, how many of them are close friends of yours? We took the
number of friends (between 0 and 60).
2) Thinking now of people who live near you - in your neighbourhood or district: How many of these people
are close friends of yours? We took the number of friends (between 0 and 90).
3) How many other close friends do you have apart from those at work, in your neighbourhood, or family
members? Think, for instance, of friends at clubs, church, or the like. We took the number of friends (between
0 and 90).
4) People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. The list below contains different types
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The difference between the coefficients of mP and mC indicate to what extent Protestant
minorities are more socially connected than Catholic minorities are. Results are reported in
Table A.5. We find no evidence of a systematic difference between minorities in terms of
social connection and no systematic difference between those in minority religions and those in
non-minority religions.
TABLE A.5 AROUND HERE
D Religion and Risk Aversion
Using SOEP 2004 data for Germany, we define five measures of risk aversion. The first is
an index of relative risk aversion (RRA) derived from a question about the amount of wind-
fall money the respondent would reinvest in a lottery with specified probabilities and returns,
following the procedure indicated in Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos (2009). This measure is
an objective experimentally validated measure (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and
Wagner, 2005). The second measure is the self-reported aversion to take risks, measured on
a scale from 0 (minimal aversion) to 10 (maximal aversion). The remaining three measures
are self-reported indicators of aversion to risk in financial matters, in one’s occupation, and in
trusting other people. In all cases the majority of respondents are clustered toward maximal
of groups. For each type of group, please tick a box to say whether you have participated in the activities of
this group in the past 12 months. We derived a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent reported
participate in church or other religious organizations and zero otherwise, and similarly for sports groups, hobbies,
or leisure clubs; charitable organizations or groups; neighbourhood associations or groups; and other associations
or groups.
5) Now, suppose you needed to borrow a large sum of money. Who would you turn to first for help? We
derived a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent answered one of the following, and zero
otherwise: husband, wife, partner, mother, father, daughter, son, sister, brother, other blood relative, in-law
relative, godparent, close friend, neighbour, someone you work with, and employer.
6-7-8) During the past 12 months, how often have you done any of the following things for people you know
personally, such as relatives, friends, neighbours or other acquaintances? a) Helped someone outside of your
household with housework or shopping b) Lent quite a bit of money to another person ; d) Helped somebody
to find a job. For all items (a, b, and d) we derived a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent
reported having helped in this way at least once in the previous twelve months, and zero otherwise.
9) There are many ways people hear about jobs - from other people, from advertisements or employment
agencies, and so on. Please indicate how you first found out about work at your present employer. We derived
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent answered parents, brothers or sisters, other relatives,
a close friend, or an acquaintance, and zero otherwise.
10-11) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? a) There are only a few people
I can trust completely; c) If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you. For item a) we derived
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent disagreed or strongly disagreed, and zero otherwise.
For item c) we derived a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed, and
zero otherwise.
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aversion. We then recoded all measures as dummies (low/high aversion) and found the propor-
tion of individuals who reported a high level of risk aversion to be similar between Catholics
and Protestants for all indicators. We estimated model (5) to determine any difference in risk
aversion between religious minorities and majorities,38 and reported the results in Table A.7.
We found no significant difference between Protestant and Catholic religious minorities or be-
tween religious majorities and minorities in any of the indicators of risk aversion we considered.
In addition, point estimates are relatively small.
TABLE A.7 AROUND HERE
E Regions and Minorities in ESS data
In order to identify religious minorities across European regions according to the definition
given in the main text, and to control for unobservable characteristics of geographic areas of
residence, we must define the regional aggregation level that we want to apply to our data
in these two dimensions. Ideally, regions should be comparable in terms of population and
size. The Eurostat NUTS classification provides four levels of aggregation: NUTS 0 identifies
countries, NUTS 1 identifies macro-regions with populations between 3 and 7 million, NUTS
2 identifies regions with populations between 800,000 and 3 million, NUTS 3 identifies regions
(sub-regions in most cases) with populations between 150,000 and 800,000. Unfortunately, not
all countries surveyed by the European Social Survey report the same NUTS levels, as some are
more disaggregated (up to level 3) and some are only at level 1. Moreover, in some cases the
number of observations at higher NUTS levels is too small to use in measuring the distribution
of religious denominations in each region, forcing us to aggregate downward. In the end, we
defined four possible aggregation criteria by which define a regional unit to apply to our ESS
data:
Region 0 : each country coincides with a region;
Region 1 : NUTS 1 whenever possible; NUTS 0 otherwise;
Region 2 : NUTS 2 whenever possible; Region 1 aggregation otherwise;
Region 3 : NUTS 3 whenever possible; Region 2 aggregation otherwise.
38Controls are individual age, gender, years of education, marital status, employment condition, parents’
religion, and regional (lander) fixed effects.
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Our dataset contains 59 regions that meet the definitions of Region 3 and Region 2, 28 that
meet the definition of Region 1, and 7 that meet the definition of Region 0. In our baseline
model, the calculation of minorities and clustering takes place at the most disaggregated regional
aggregation level (i.e., Region 3 ). Geographic fixed effects are at the country level. We perform
a number of robustness checks (discussed in section 5.4) by changing the aggregation level for
calculating minorities.
Our definition of “minority” states that the religion dir of an individual i residing in region
r is a minority religion if: a) the market share of dir is the smallest in region r and (b) its
market share in region r is less than 25 percent.
We also considered alternative definitions of a minority religion in our analysis:
(i) the religion dir of an individual i residing in region r is a minority religion if its market
share in region r is less than 25 percent;
(ii) the religion dir of an individual i residing in region r is a minority religion if condition (i)
holds and if dir is Protestant (Catholic) and its market share is smaller than that of Catholicism
(Protestantism);
(iii) the religion dir of an individual i residing in region r is a minority religion if the market
share of dir is the smallest in region r.
Our preferred definition is the most stringent, while a priori no clear ranking exists among
the other three. In general, these alternative definitions map to a similar set of regions, as
only a few regions in Germany are affected by the adoption of alternative definitions of a
minority religion and those do so only when Protestantism is considered. (The regions that
report Catholic minorities are essentially the same across alternative definitions.) In order to
avoid measurement errors, we always exclude from our sample regions with fewer than fifty
respondents. However, our results do not change when we include all regions.
F Further Summary Statistics and Estimations
The ESS sample by country and wave is described in Table A.1, and the summary statistics
of regional controls are displayed in Table A.2. The estimation of our baseline model, dropping
one country at a time, shows that our estimates do not depend on the inclusion of a particular
country in the sample. These estimates are available upon request. The extent of religious
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discrimination across religions is reported in Table A.6.
A Appendix Tables
Table A.1: European Social Survey, countries
of the Former Holy Roman Empire and base-
line model sample size.
Country 1 2 3 4 Total
AT 758 691 893 0 2342
BE 344 302 288 307 1241
CZ 118 275 0 0 393
DE 643 629 700 687 2659
FR 0 0 48 45 93
LU 300 398 0 0 698
PL 117 95 93 87 392
SI 270 337 266 275 1148
Total 2550 2727 2288 1401 8966
Source: ESS data, 2002-2008.
Table A.2: Summary statistics of regional controls
country Un rate Motorway Pop dens Doctors GDP growth Graduate
AT 4.5 38.0 873 348 2.1 0.17
BE 7.5 60.2 750 391 2.5 0.30
CZ 8.0 7.9 371 351 8.8 0.12
DE 10.9 41.9 520 338 1.6 0.25
FR 8.0 20.5 110 315 2.0 0.22
IT 2.7 25.4 64 297 2.0 0.10
LU 3.9 52.7 175 280 4.5 0.21
PL 19.6 4.1 109 216 6.1 0.15
SI 6.0 29.4 121 228 5.4 0.22
Total 7.8 38.6 504 327 3.5 0.22
Source: ESS data, 2002-2008
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Table A.6: Discrimination among religious minorities.
Prot. vs Cath. Prot. min vs Cath. min Prot. maj vs Cath. maj
Belong to a
discriminated
group
0.32 0.86 0.69
Discriminated
for religious
reasons
0.80 0.75 0.61
Note: p-values of independent sample t-tests that compare the degree of discrimination between Protes-
tants and Catholics in our estimation data. H0 is no difference in the means. The tests, which compare
total Protestant and Catholics as well as minority and majority Protestants and Catholics only, indicate
no significant differences in means between any of the compared groups.
Table A.7: Risk aversion among Catholics and Protestants in Germany.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RRA risk finrisk occrisk trustrisk
Min Prot - Min Cath 0.029 -0.038 -0.024 -0.001 0.021
(0.044) (0.042) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044)
Maj Prot - Maj Cath -0.039 -0.016 0.036 -0.010 -0.002
(0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.037)
Obs 11272 11213 11163 10097 11217
R2 0.054 0.087 0.075 0.131 0.052
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: OLS linear probability model estimates of equation (1) on SOEP 2004 data.
RRA is relative risk aversion; risks is the aversion to risk in general; and finrisk, oc-
crisk, and trustrisk are aversion to risk in financial matters, in occupation and in
trusting others, respectively (0 is low aversion and 1 is high aversion). Controls are
lander dummies, age, gender, years of education, marital status, employment condi-
tion, and parents’ religion.
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